Social Realism (SR), as a movement that argues for 'bringing knowledge back in' to curriculum (Young 2008) , is significant globally, especially in South Africa. This article examines arguments from SR proponents that curriculum selection should privilege specialised disciplinary knowledge-as 'powerful knowledge'-over 'everyday knowledge', and how this is warranted through Durkheim's distinction between 'sacred' and 'profane' social bases for knowledge. The article asks how adequately curriculum based on SR warrants can do social justice. This inquiry stages debates between SR and three alternative approaches. The first is standpoint theories that knowledge-including that of scientific disciplines-is always positional and 'partially objective'. The next is Vygotskian arguments for curriculum that, dialectically, joins systematising powers of scientific knowledge with rich funds of knowledge from learners' everyday life-worlds. Third, SR's philosophical framing is contrasted with Nancy Fraser's (2009) framework for robust social justice in globalising contexts. It is argued that SR's grounds for curriculum knowledge selection emphasise cognitive purposes for schooling in ways that marginalise ethical purposes. In consequence, SR conceptions of what constitutes social-educational 'justice' are too thin, we argue, to meet substantive needs and aspirations among power-marginalised South African groups seeking better lives through schooling.
backgrounds of those who have most access to knowledge or who give it legitimacy … [but] to what the knowledge can do or what intellectual power it gives…. Powerful knowledge provides more reliable explanations … for engaging in political, moral, and other kinds of debates…. In modern societies, powerful knowledge is, increasingly, specialized knowledge; and schooling, from this perspective, is about providing access to the specialized knowledge that is embodied in different knowledge domains.
A persuasive argument here is not to sacrifice the value of knowledge that has been hard-wrought by specialist disciplinary communities, by dismissing it as merely or primarily 'power-knowledge': i.e. knowledge made powerful by the arbitrariness of historical struggles in which certain social-structural positions gain upper hands over others to shape curriculum. It is important to consider how knowledge can be empowering in its own right, apart from the arbitrariness by which 'winners' in power struggles can promote their ways of knowing relative to others. Indeed, as critical sociologists of education, we are specialists who would not devalue our hard work to advance knowledge about structural inequality as simply an arbitrary view. We thus share something of Young's valuation about 'more reliable explanations' that provide greater 'intellectual power' to engage in political and moral domains of social life.
(See also Wheelahan's arguments (2010; that 'powerful knowledge' provides those in adult education with critical-analytical power, beyond mere skills and facts, to read the social worlds of their practice.) However, we demur regarding how SR warrants 'powerful knowledge' to deserve overwhelming centrality in curriculum, due-in their argumentation-to a 'sacred' esteem accorded to the 'truth' value of knowledge generated by those in specialist (or disciplinary) communities. Says Young (2008a:31-32 ):
[T]he objectivity of knowledge is in part located in the social networks, institutions and codes of practice built up by knowledge producers over time. It is these networks of social relations that, in crucial ways, guarantee truth claims, and give the knowledge that has [been] produced its emergent powers…. [S] pecialist forms of social organization remain the major social bases for guaranteeing the objectivity of knowledge.
This claim for the 'truth' value of specialist knowledge goes against many decades of constructivist epistemology in the sociology of knowledge, as indicated in the subtitle of Young's book (2008a) Bringing knowledge back in: From social constructivism to social realism in the sociology of education. The adjective 'social', prefixed to 'realism', is important: specialist knowledge is not transcendental but socially generated. Yet, while SRs agree that socially generated knowledge can never yield unmitigated, transparent truth about social 'realities', their claim is serious about specialist communities as the social locus that guarantees progressively greater approximations of objective truth. This claim applies to both natural and social science disciplines (with recognition of greater limitations on the truth-value of social science knowledge).
On what basis can specialist knowledge achieve such rarefied power-of-truth? After all, do we not find that actually practising communities of specialist knowledge, situated in given times and places, typically consist far more of men, and/or those who are white, and/or born to families of relatively powerful socio-economic status, etc? Are there no partialities of perspective in such imbalances of membership?
Indeed, Young himself 'in no way denies that the production and transmission of knowledge is always entangled with a complex set of contending social interests and power relations ' (2008a:31) . We read this to acknowledge that actually practising knowledge communities encounter contestations both from outside and within. So:
how can specialist production of knowledge nonetheless bypass partial perspective to a degree that guarantees truth? The SR answer is suggested in Young's reference to networks, institutions and practice codes that build up over [historic] time-and also across social spaces. SRs here invest strongly in Durkheim's distinction between 'sacred' and 'profane' social grounds of knowledge. Says Young (2008a:146-147) :
Durkheim … wanted to emphasize the 'sociality' of knowledge, but in contrast to social constructivism, stressed the differences not the similarities between different types of knowledge, and explored the different types of social organization associated with them…. His starting point was a distinction between profane and sacred orders of meaning that he found in every society that he studied. The profane refers to people's response to their everyday world-it is practical, immediate and particular…. [T] he sacred was a collective product of a society, and not related directly to any real world problem … [and so] both social and removed from the everyday world.
Although inhering in a religious locus in earlier historic periods, 'the sacred for Durkheim', notes Young (ibid:147) , 'became the paradigm for all other kinds of conceptual knowledge including science, philosophy and mathematics ' (ibid:147) .
Wherever 'sacred' and 'profane' might divergently locate in given historic eras, Young and Muller (2010:121) suggest it was in the differentiation between the 'sacred' as an internally consistent world of concepts and the 'profane' as a vague and contradictory continuum of procedures and practices that Durkheim found the social basis of science and the origins of speculative thought.
That is, the 'sacred' plane of meaning constitutes a far deeper, broader and more cohesively ordered continuum of concepts and practices than the 'profane'. Compared to the vague and contradictory resonances that emerge across diverse sites of profane (everyday) knowledge, there is, say Maton and Moore (2010) , a special 'capacity for intellectual fields to build powerful and cumulative knowledge over time' (ibid:6), which consists in a 'coalition of minds extending across time and space ' (ibid:12) . In explicating this 'coalition of minds', Maton and Moore (ibid:10) quote a rousing passage from Durkheim (1967:15): Collective representations are the product of an immense cooperation that extends not only through space but also through time; to make them, a multitude of different minds have associated, intermixed, and combined their ideas and feelings; long generations have accumulated their experience and knowledge.
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The logic seems to be that diverse and plural streamlets of actually situated knowledge 'communities' flow into, and ultimately partake of, a great river of singular communion across a vast reach of social space and historic time. We read this to suggest that we need not worry over partialities and contestations inhering in situated instances of disciplinary knowledge work. Rather, any limits on objectivity of given instances are transcended in the social-historical accumulation across which multitudinous sites of work on knowledge mix and combine. This long accumulation flows towards convergence that-in the impartiality of its vastness-dissolves progressively accumulated disciplinary knowledge of any partialities among members situated in particular time/space locations of knowledge work. No matter, then, if concrete time/space instances of scientific community comprise people whose socialstructural positions and cultural-historical perspectives do not equally represent groups populating the wider social space. Via Durkheim, SR thus conjures a locus of knowledge production at once social yet otherworldly ('sacred') in its extending continuum that transcends particular time/space settings.
With due respect to Durkheim, this trope of 'long generations' of 'immense cooperation' strikes us as a grand hyperbole. Moreover, invoked by SRs to warrant a truth-guaranteeing impartiality of specialist knowledge communities, we see it as a desired imaginary: an article of faith, not fact-and a faith on which a good deal of argumentative effort to distinguish social realism from social constructivism hinges.
Defending 'sacred' impartiality against 'profane' partial objectivity invoke Durkheim in a call to arms against critical analysts who give focus to how partial perspectives, associated with elite socialstructural positions (or standpoints), predominate in curriculum:
Durkheim's description encapsulates … the nature of the social realist enterprise: a key aspect of the process of knowledge production and development is its sociality … in a shared intellectual field. Because constructivist and post-structuralist approaches see only power at play, they cannot fully understand the social nature of knowledge…. By overfocusing on the social (in terms of power relations) and neglecting 8 knowledge they paradoxically neglect a crucial dimension of the social in knowledge and education.
It is here claimed that, unlike social realists, social constructivists do not take knowledge seriously qua knowledge ('powerful knowledge'), seeing only relations of power inequality at play ('knowledge that has power'). We will argue that this is a reductive caricature, which refuses to see how 'constructivist' projects can take seriously both the power of knowledge and the power relations infused in knowledge.
To begin, we recall that SRs do allow that social-structural power relations often infuse educational knowledge selection; says Moore (2013:339) : 'it might in fact be the case that official educational knowledge does reflect the standpoint and interests of dominant social groups' (in this and further quotes from Moore 2013, italics are in the original). Nor do SRs disagree with the basic 'constructivist' premise that knowledge of realities (natural or social) is always socially constructed, never transparently revealed. Says Moore (ibid:344) , 'all knowledge is humanly produced and reflects the condition under which it is produced', which means 'that knowledge is always fallible … [and so] constantly open to revision'. This modifies how we might take Young's assertion (cited earlier) that the deep social networks of intellectual fields 'guarantee truth claims'. What SRs claim as guaranteed is not absolute or final truth, but superior progressive advancement on truth due to capacities special to conditions and procedures of intellectual knowledge fields. The sociality of these fields, says Moore (ibid:345) , assures ' judgemental rationality … more powerful than others' in that 'the knowledge so produced is more reliable by virtue of how it is produced'.
Social realists mark their distinction from constructivists, then, in upholding the special(ist) status-Durkheim's 'sacredness'-of intellectual fields as loci of judgemental rationality that significantly transcends partialities and so guarantees powers of knowledge qua knowledge. In contrast, constructivists fail to respect a special locus of judgement-they see intellectual communities, too, as inevitably partial in their knowledge productions, and so prone to 'profane' plays of unequal power relation in those productions. Constructivists thus cannot escape what SR's see as the greatest sin of rejecting a 'sacred' court of appeal to judgement: relativism.
Says Young (2008a:25; our Standpoint theory emerged among feminists in circumstances where claims to speak in the name of 'women' were contested as both partial to 'white Anglo professional class' women's experiences, and over-emphasising gender relative to other significant axes of power relation. From these discussions emerged theory that ways of seeing/knowing 'realities' are always partial in being positional: we see from somewhere (standpoints), not everywhere (Haraway 1988) . As well, our perspectives are constructed within intersections of multiple positions in power relations, which shift in salience depending on social context and life history. However, standpoint theorists see partialities of epistemic perspective as grounded in ontological gravities of historically materialised social structures, which are neither infinite nor equally weighty. Hence, partialities are not a matter of 'anything goes'; standpoint theorists thus refute notions that their approach is 'relativist'. Rather, situated perspectives represent partial objectivities of insight into social-ontological realities. It is then possible to pursue a robust social science that triangulates partial perspectives via methodologies of 'power-sensitive conversation', yielding 'stronger objectivity' than the 'God trick' (Haraway 1988) Harding here claims a social science that is about knowledge qua knowledge, not simply a reduction of knowledge to power relations. This approach takes structural power relations seriously-indeed, as an object of sociological objectification-but also takes seriously that explanatory power ('powerful knowledge') can be gained by the hard work of specialist knowledge communities to map systematic causalities across the partial objectivities that they research. We suggest that, up to a point, this agrees with SR claims for specialist powers of intellectual networks to achieve strong with a "non-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world"; however, such a combination would be impossible if she was a curriculum developer or a teacher.
We suggest that a curriculum developer or teacher could, like standpoint theorists, combine these two tenets, and Young's retort about impossibility is ad hominem.
However, we read his main impulse to be rejection of the first tenet on grounds that we cannot forfend against relativism unless we purchase the impartiality of a locus of judgemental rationality that is sacredly separated from profane power-relational dynamics. Hence, SRs see no call to consider the argument that triangulation across partially objectifying accounts could yield a 'stronger objectivity'. (We have seen no SR text that suspends the shout of 'constructivist-equals-relativist' long enough to consider the actual argument.) Again, we stress that SR argumentation hinges on faith in the social-ontological 'reality' of an impartial locus achieved by 'immense cooperation' across 'long generations'. If we find we cannot purchase this faith, then standpoint theorists' more modest claim for 'stronger objectivity'-achievable when diverse scholarly communities triangulate partially objectified knowledges-is, we suggest, a better purchase. The evidence of our sense and judgement, as knowledge workers across educational fields of sociology, curriculum and policy, is that these fields do not embody the impartiality and cumulative coherence wished for by SRs, either presently or via past-present-future accumulation (as Kuhn 1962 , perhaps overdoing historical discontinuity, nonetheless cogently argued even for 'hard science' fields).
We thus advocate a more modest claim for 'judgemental rationality' achievable in our fields by practice of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) call 'reflexive sociology'-akin to Haraway's (1988) 'power sensitive conversation'-that takes self-critical account of what positional standpoints are centred, marginalised and absent within field networks, and how these power relations affect knowledge work in our fields.
Moreover, conceptual investment in a 'context-independent' locus of social-yetimpartial knowledge-removed from profane contexts of power struggle-seems, ironically, to incite a wish for this 'sacred' social realm to be ethics-free as well as epistemologically non-arbitrary. Young and Muller (2010:122-123) , in discussing how SR builds upon Durkheim, note a problem that they wish to attenuate:
Stressing socio-cognitive over socio-ethical purposes for education
[T]here remains the issue that … [f]or Durkheim, the social is the moral: it is about values. Insofar as knowledge (and the curriculum) are social, they too for Durkheim are primarily moral issues. This makes it difficult to use his framework to explore questions of knowledge content and structure that are avoided by … social constructivism. Is Durkheim right in equating the social with the moral, even when it comes to the question of knowledge? Or can we envision a non-moral concept of the social? We think the answer to the latter question must be yes … [because] issues of the structure and content of knowledge must lie at the heart of the sociology of the curriculum.
'The social' where Young and Muller look for a non-moral address to knowledge questions is of course not the profane but the sacred locus. As part and parcel of their strong binary separation of 'sacred' from 'profane', they here suggest a stark either/or: questions of knowledge selection for curriculum must find authorisation in a social-epistemological but not social-ethical basis. Against this view, we will argue that a both/and-ethical-and-epistemological-valuation of reasons for curriculum knowledge selection is both viable and desirable, and indeed their mutual exclusion is impossible. We will argue further that conjuring such a mutual exclusion severely curtails dialogue and debate about purposes for curriculum. However, we need first to examine the reasoning and assumptions behind such impulse to separate ethics from knowledge questions. As is by now well known, [Bernstein] distinguished between two forms of discourse, horizontal and vertical, and within vertical discourse, between two kinds of knowledge structure: hierarchical and horizontal.
Regarding discourse forms, Bernstein made a broad distinction between 'vertical' modes of knowledge that characterise intellectual disciplines, compared to 'horizontal' modes that characterise social spaces of everyday life. In terms of That is, disciplinary fields such as sociology are 'vertical' in relative contrast to everyday life knowledge. However, compared, say, to physics-Bernstein's par excellence example of a hierarchically structured field-sociology embodies 'weak grammar'; and Young and Muller, as educational sociologists, hope to find ways to 'stiffen its vertical spine' rather than remain 'uncomfortably close to the relativism of pragmatism and constructivism' (ibid:128).
We appreciate Bernstein's historical-analytic distinctions between how the knowledge structures of different disciplines have taken form. We agree that knowledge development in our field-sociology of education-is 'horizontal' as defined above, compared to physics. Yet we do not share SR discomfort with this more parallel than 14 vertical accumulation of conceptual tools and problematics. On similar grounds to above arguments for standpoint theory, we do not see a 'relativist' tragedy, since both older and newer conceptual lenses do get tested for explanatory power in relation to socially emergent problematics that are materially substantive, not anything-goes.
Moreover, these lenses can triangulate (they are not all incommensurable with each other) around problematics, shedding mutual light on each other's 'blind spots' (Wagner 1993 ) to yield 'stronger objectivity' which, we argue, does generate widened explanatory reach.
We also agree that life-world knowledge is 'horizontal' compared to disciplinary bodies of knowledge. However we challenge SR characterisations of this horizontality that strike us as a deficit view that misses rich potentials to use life-world knowledge for curriculum learning purposes. Here (briefly) is Bernstein's definition (1999:159): We are all aware and use a form of knowledge, usually typified as everyday or 'common-sense' knowledge…. This form has a group of well-known features: it is likely to be oral, local, context dependent and specific, tacit, multi-layered and contradictory across but not within contexts….
[T]he crucial feature is that is it segmentally organised.
If SRs worry about losing explanatory reach to 'relativism' via 'weak grammars' of some disciplinary knowledge fields, which still have relative verticality and they still see fit to include in curriculum, they are far more worried about the degrees to which everyday knowledge embodies segmentation (not integration), locality (not generality), context dependence (not context-independence), and contradiction (not coherence and commensurability) across contexts. Young (2008a:89) 
asserts:
Bernstein's distinction between vertical and horizontal knowledge structures … assumes that … the codes and practices associated with subjects and disciplines … are designed to set the curriculum apart from the everyday knowledge that students bring to school … [and] it is this separation of the curriculum from everyday life that gives the knowledge acquired through it an explanatory power and capacity for generalization that is not a feature of everyday knowledge tied to practical concerns…. Certain principles for guiding curriculum policy necessarily follow …[including that] curriculum cannot be based on everyday practical experience. Such a curriculum would only recycle that experience.
To avoid basing curriculum on everyday practical experience does not mean there is no pedagogic use for lifeworld-based knowledge in classrooms. Bernstein argues that, depending on which learners and subjects, teaching can usefully entail stronger or weaker boundary separation (what Bernstein calls 'classification') between disciplinary and everyday knowledge. However, SRs are insistent that 'The purpose of schooling … is to specialise learners' voice by induct[ing] learners into the "uncommonsense" knowledge of formal education-or the school code' (Hoadley 2006:16) . This means that life-world knowledge can at best be used as stepping stones to scaffold learning towards induction into vertical (specialised) knowledge codes, leaving life-based horizontal codes behind.
From a SR perspective, the contaminating deficits that everyday experiential knowledge imparts to curriculum go beyond the problem that everyday knowledge is confined to local sensibility, thus segmented across locales. SRs see co-related problems that get closer to why they seek a non-moral social basis for curriculum knowledge selection. To grasp their view of ethical grounds for curriculum as contaminating, we explore Young's (2008a) efforts to work out whether/how Vygotsky offers viable ways to ameliorate some problems with, and so strengthen, the Durkheimian framework that SR privileges.
Young suggests that Durkheim saw the 'sacred' locus of collective social representations in too holistic a way, making it difficult to conceptualise how given social knowledge fields change historically. As Young sees it, an interactive dynamic between different parts within a social 'whole' is needed to conceptualise historical movement in knowledge development at specialist levels. Young is therefore intrigued that Vygotsky, while paralleling Durkheim in distinguishing between 'scientific' and 'everyday' knowledge, at the same time enables a historical dynamic by conceptualising an 'interrelatedness of the two types of concept', which 'offers some advantages over a Durkheimian analysis ' (ibid:58 [T]o the extent to which Vygotsky was a Marxist, epistemological questions about knowledge as a separate category distinct from practice did not exist; they were always resolved in practice, in the course of history. It follows that Vygotsky's distinction between scientific and common-sense concepts was a contingent one to be overcome in practice and through learning. For Durkheim the separation between theoretical knowledge and common sense was not contingent-it was real; the development of knowledge … involved the progressive replacement of one kind of theoretical knowledge (religion) by another (science). Hence the necessary social basis of knowledge.
In this contrast, Young again champions Durkheimian separation of 'profane' and 'sacred' social grounds for knowledge, with school curriculum based on the latter as where powerful knowledge truly advances. Elsewhere (ibid:74) he quotes 'Durkheim's view that "in all the history of human thought there exists no example of two categories (the sacred and the profane) so profoundly differentiated or so radically opposed" (Durkheim 1995:53) '. In further passages, he urges a need to sustain this 'insularity' against relativist dangers of 'hybridity'. But we ask: Is interrelation, rather than stark binary separation, so terrible for learning purposes?
Cannot school learning advance through rich curricular interaction between everyday and scientific knowledge? Young (2008a:51-52)  Vygotsky's emphasis on social activity appears to preclude him from treating knowledge as something that can be conceptualized as separate from its uses. The importance of being able to separate knowledge from its uses is of course Durkheim's key point in his critique of pragmatism (66).
 Durkheim was seeking an answer to why we find logic so compelling; in other words, where, he asked, did its undoubted power over our thinking come from? For Durkheim this power could never arise out of its usefulness in terms of satisfying specific needs. Consequences, he argued, are inevitably unreliable criteria for truth. The power of logic has to refer to factors that are a priori and external to any specific human activity (70).
In the above passages, we italicise words we see to have significant ethical tonalities.
Along with the epistemological contaminants of horizontality-contingency, contradiction, segmentation-ethically inflected problems of practical life mattering-use, purpose, need-are seen to taint the a priori power of knowledge in a 'sacred' realm of non-moralised logos. (In effect, this is logo-centric insistence on a fact-value distinction-a point to which we return later 1 ). It would seem that separation of knowledge questions from ethics questions is necessary to guarantee that compellingly powerful logic, from a high-minded plane beyond actual human activity and its uses and purposes, can exist and so be brought to bear in explanatory application to profane life-worldly matters. The sacred plane must primarily be about advancing knowledge and its power to establish objectivity and truth, not morality. Everyday concepts provide the "conceptual fabric" for the development of schooled concepts, and the everyday concepts are also transformed through their connection with the more systematic concepts. Scientific concepts grow into the everyday, into the domain of personal experience, thus acquiring meaning and significance.
However, scientific concepts bring with them conscious awareness and control, which Vygotsky believed to be essential characteristics of schooling.
In Vygotsky's rationale for a curriculum dialectic, as rendered by Moll, specialised systems of thought are crucial for learning, and have the effect of transforming everyday concepts: 'verticalising' their structure, we might say. However, scientific concepts reciprocally gain living significance from the dialectical interrelation. As We suggest that life-based knowledge as ongoing foundation for further learning applies not only to learning processes in schools, but also to knowledge work in specialist communities. In this view, particularly in 'human' and 'social' science disciplines, research problematics that matter for future knowledge work continuously emerge from life more primarily than science. Science-worlds, then, ought not aspire to leave life-worlds behind in determining where new knowledge might matter. Rather, they need continuing contact with the life-breath of newly emergent problems and associated sense-makings from life-worlds, or they become static: they lose the livingness of history as change (which Young flagged as a challenge for Durkheim's 'sacred'). This is a key argument in many 'practice' and 'pragmatist' philosophies of science (Stengers 1997; Carr & Kemmis 1986; Biesta 2014 (Bhaskar 1989:49-50) .
(While we lack textual space to discuss those who join aspects of Bernstein and Vygotsky in pursuing greater explanatory power, in ways we consider less hampered by SR's insistent binarism, we note Daniels (2012) 
Bringing ethical valuations back in
It is important to appreciate that, in the 'funds of knowledge' (henceforth FoK) approach for bringing life-world knowledge into curriculum, the everyday knowledge brought in is hardly of the banal sort that the South African OBE curriculum featured:
'driving a car, tying your shoelaces, cooking rice' (Hoadley & Jansen 2009:181) . Moll et al. (1992) selects FoK by a process of research in students' home and community locales, followed by study groups in which academic-and teacher-researchers discuss 'theory, data collection, and findings' to identify FoK with a richness worth building into curriculum units. In this process, a key selective principle is the lived use-value of knowledge. Say Moll et al. (1992:133; our as compared to universal ('vertical') knowledge from the 'sacred' plane of specialist disciplines, it is mired in 'need', 'purpose', and other political-ethical limits of 'horizontality': of being 'local, context dependent and specific, tacit, multi-layered and contradictory across … contexts' (Bernstein 1999:159) .
Vygotskian approaches, then, reclaim a use-value ethics that SRs see as thankfully voided in specialist knowledge processes, and want likewise to avoid in curriculum.
Against this, we argue-joining both Vygotskians and standpoint theorists-that it is precisely the situated partiality of life-world funds of knowledge that enables such knowledge to contribute to 'stronger objectivity' that triangulates across contexts of 'partial objectivity' and to bring valuable ethical considerations into educative-and scientific-settings. Furthermore, we question whether life-world FoK is as limited by 'horizontality' as SRs assert. That is, 'power-sensitive conversation' across life-world settings, furthered by educative processes, can raise consciousness to how place-based FoK carry global dimensions running across locales. Freirean educational workparalleling FoK approaches-scaffolds vernacular oral literacies of people in highpoverty locations towards written literacy capacity. In the process, educators and power-marginalised people think together, teach each other, and raise critical consciousness to 'generative themes' of global connection that run within-and-across local social spaces (Freire 1970; Shor 1987) . This is another kind of dialectical education that, in linking local FoK with globalising problematics, identifies deep and extensive-we might say 'verticalising'-global connections between localities.
While we agree with SRs that redistributing 'knowledge that has power'-cultural capital-ought not dominate ethical pursuit of social justice via curriculum, we also argue that the problem of arbitrary selective coding of curriculum with the 'capital' of those in power-elite social-structural positions cannot be treated as inconsequential.
There is indeed a tendency in SR argumentation to suggest that curricular provision of wider access to 'powerful knowledge' renders this problem moot. Maton and Moore thus argue (2010:10):
Social realism attempts to recover knowledge in the service of progress and social justice. The impulse underlying social realist work is … both the creation of epistemologically more powerful forms of knowledge and establishing the means to enable them to be accessible to everyone.
Moore extends this argument (2013:350; original italics):
SR is the appropriate framework for socially progressive sociology of education because it secures, contra … constructivist relativisms, strong justice claims with strong rather than weak knowledge claims.
The powerful are so not because they can arbitrarily impose their knowledge/culture as 'powerful knowledge/culture', but because they enjoy privileged access to the knowledge/culture that is powerful in its own right.
These statements seem to assert that-already, and not in some future in which powerful interests no longer hold sway to institute their knowledge as an unjustly selective 'gold standard' in curriculum-the only social justice problem is access to knowledge that is 'powerful in its own right'. It would seem the most powerfully specialist knowledge is one-and-the-same as the 'cultural capital' most valued by those who are structurally powerful. Hence, we need not worry about arbitrary injustice in which 'knowledge that has power' is imposed. We need simply redistribute powerful knowledge, via curriculum, so that it is everyone's and not the hoarded 'capital' of the few.
If only the vastly and deeply instituted logic of capital-as powerful accumulations of commodities that are exchange-valued for their manufactured scarcity-could be so easily undone. SR denial of formidable processes that sustain selective coding of curriculum to reproduce inequalities supports a thin conception of justice as mere redistribution of access to empowering knowledge. In the process, complex ethical matters linked to structural power inequalities are avoided. As when extracting morality from Durkheim's 'sacred' social plane, SRs thus make curriculum justice a matter of epistemology trumping ethics rather than inseparable from ethics. In the next section we draw on Nancy Fraser's thick conception of 'justice' to argue that, in limiting curriculum 'justice' to access to knowledge developed in specialised locations, SRs avoid inextricable questions not merely of what knowledge is selected, but whose knowledge, and how selected. Robust address to these matters of justice, we argue (with Fraser), requires joining knowledge redistribution to ethical concerns for recognition of diverse cultural knowledge, and representation of diverse socialcultural groups in processes of knowledge selection.
Pursuing robust social-educational justice in globalizing conditions
We here draw on When framing assumptions diverge at a level of philosophical first principles-as do
Fraser's from those of SR-adjudication is possible not by 'proof' but in tests of explanatory power to address social-historical conditions that matter to both, and/or to others who apply them to conditions. It is important, then, to recognise that Fraser's critique of 'normal social science' is based not only on a trans-historical argumentthat it is never possible to separate 'fact' from 'value'-but also on historical grounds:
'normal science' proves inadequate to address globalising conditions. Fraser argues Fraser's historical-contextual diagnosis of Westphalian-framed 'normal science'
implicates SR claims that we have critiqued, viz: (1) the impartiality of science; (2) the possibility and virtue of separating epistemic truth from ethical valuation; and (3) 'justice' as primarily a question of what resources need redistributing to people. We appreciate how SR stress on powerfully focused cognitive capacities might appeal to South African curriculum developers following the terribly thin 'everyday competencies' promoted in OBE curriculum. We are also mindful of the difficult pragmatics of curriculum design in South African school systems facing great challenges for implementing curriculum, and for augmenting teachers' content and and 'parity' principles. However, we argue it is always better to face actually presenting complexities in commensurately robust ways, rather than evade or simplify those complexities.
We need further to consider the historical matrix of South African struggles for knowledge, well preceding 1994. SR does not just enter into a breach left by the failed Curriculum 2005 reform. It also enters the long history in which South Africa has been a colonial laboratory for the 'cultural imperialism' (Said 1993) in which global west/north epistemologies have been imposed on the diverse indigenous and enslaved-migrant groups who greatly outnumber 'settler' groups (see Soudien 2010) .
We suggest the need to reclaim and move forward with the too-quickly bypassed first impulse, post-1994, for culturally inclusive education. There are academic and activist forces in South Africa that have been waiting to bring this impulse again to the fore: a socially redemptive impulse which needs to come into productive dialectic with the knowledge-centred impulse that SR has brought to the table. We suggest that South Africa, as a post-colonial region within a post-Westphalian globalising world, is ripe to become a laboratory for new framings of education: to develop approaches to curriculum selection and enactment that consider framing in relation to historic time and place; and to engage in discussion/debate about the what/who/how of justice.
Curriculum development, and curriculum enactment in schools, should take up the project of analysing and debating frames, and of proactive re-framing to enable rich realisation of social-epistemological-ethical purposes for schooling and wider social life. Such reclamation and forward movement is particularly needed in South Africa, where long histories of marginalisation and disenfranchisement of diverse and substantial population groups need robust social justice redress.
Much remains to be worked out that has been halting and difficult since the great political change of 1994. Debates now need to be opened, not narrowed. SR has served important purposes in helping to pull away from a weak OBE curriculum orientation. However, capacities for bringing ethics-and-knowledge back into focus are now greatly needed, in school and university learning-and-teaching, in non-and informal-educational settings, and for democratic dialogue about curriculum among educational academics, policy makers and wider publics. Curriculum design, we argue, is both a broad social project of great importance to the diverse many, and a project for re-contextualisation in practices of schooling. At academic, policy and praxis levels, there needs to be inclusive and participatory debate on questions of knowledge and curriculum selection.
